Propeller separates in flight from Great Barrier Airlines Britten-Norman Trislander

New Zealand's Transport Accident Investigation Commission has opened an inquiry into an incident in which a Britten-Norman Trislander aircraft, operated by Great Barrier Airlines, lost a propeller while in flight shortly before noon on July 5, 2009. The aircraft had just departed Claris Airport, Great Barrier Island, en route to Auckland when the propeller separated from the starboard engine and impacted the fuselage. The pilot returned to Claris immediately and made a safe emergency landing.

News reports from New Zealand say the impact of the errant propeller smashed a window and tore off a door on the starboard side of the aircraft. There was no one seated beside that door. According to a report in The New Zealand Herald, two passengers among the 10 on board "needed medical treatment to remove debris from their eyes."

More photos from The New Zealand Herald.

[Photo Source]

Emily Howell Warner -- Legend of Aviation

Emily Howell Warner, the first woman to become an airline pilot in the United States, tells her story:



If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on YouTube.

NTSB determines probable cause of ABX Air Boeing 767 freighter fire at San Francisco

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has completed its investigation into a fire that erupted on an ABX Air Boeing 767-200 aircraft (registration N799AX) on January 28, 2008 while the cargo aircraft was parked at San Francisco International Airport. The report issued today summarizes the findings, probable cause, and safety recommendations arising from the investigation.

Today's NTSB report states that the probable cause "was due to the design of oxygen system hoses and the lack of positive separation between electrical wiring and electrically conductive oxygen system components. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) failure to require the installation of new oxygen system hoses to remedy a safety issue previously identified by Boeing was cited as a
contributing factor."

Excerpt from the press release announcing the NTSB's findings (re-paragraphed for easier reading):

At 10:15 PM PT, on June 28, 2008, at San Francisco
International Airport, an ABX Air Boeing 767 cargo airplane experienced a ground fire just aft of the cockpit area before engine startup.

The cargo airplane was operating as flight 1611 and was destined for Wilmington, Ohio.

Airport rescue and firefighting (ARFF) personnel extinguished the fire, which had burned holes through the crown of the aircraft in the forward galley area, in a timely manner. The captain and first officer, the only two aboard the aircraft
at the time of the fire, evacuated the airplane through the cockpit windows and were not injured.

The fire started in the supernumerary compartment, which is located between the cockpit and the main deck cargo compartment.

Crew descriptions about what was heard when the fire started, combined with Safety Board testing, revealed that the ignition source had to be within the oxygen hose. The Safety Board's investigation determined that a short circuit to the supplemental oxygen system reached the oxygen hose.

The design of the hose included an internal spring, which could be heated by the inadvertent application of electrical current, causing the plastic hose to ignite. Safety Board testing found that the hose design brought together the three elements for a fire: the coil acting as an ignition source, the hose material acting as a fuel, and the oxygen to promote burning.

Boeing had previously identified safety issues involving conductive hoses and had issued a service bulletin instructing operators of aircraft with these hoses in the cockpit to replace them with nonconductive ones. The FAA approved the bulletin but did not issue an airworthiness directive to make compliance with the bulletin mandatory.

The Safety Board also found that other ABX 767 aircraft's supplemental oxygen system did not include positive separation between electrical wiring and oxygen system tubing. Electrical wiring that is near or in contact with oxygen system tubing creates the potential for electrical short circuits to reach the oxygen system hoses. The involvement of oxygen in a fire can significantly expedite its growth and severity.

Prior to the accident, ABX maintenance personnel performed numerous instances of oxygen system servicing on the accident aircraft, indicating a chronic problem on the airplane. However, ABX did not develop a specific action plan to resolve the identified discrepancies.

The lack of further action was not stipulated by ABX's continuing analysis and surveillance program (CASP). The Safety Board determined that ABX's CASP did not properly address and correct the oxygen leaks. However, these previous oxygen leaks did not directly cause the fire.

"The hose design issue, which was one factor that gave rise to this accident, should have provided the FAA with plenty of warning that, if left unaddressed, could result in a serious accident, as we have seen here," said NTSB Acting Chairman Mark V. Rosenker.

"Had the fire started when the plane was in the air, the result would very likely have been catastrophic."

As a result of the investigation, the Safety Board voted to recommend that the FAA:

• require operators to replace electrically conductive hoses with electrically nonconductive hoses and prohibit further use of conductive hoses unless the conductivity is an approved design element
• formalize the airworthiness directive (AD) process so it addresses all possible uses of an appliance affected by an AD
• require positive separation between electrical wiring and oxygen system tubing; ensure that oxygen system tubing in proximity to electrical wiring is made of, sleeved with, or coated with nonconductive material or is isolated from
  potential electrical sources
• develop and implement electrical grounding requirements for oxygen system components for all transport-category aircraft
• develop inspection criteria or service life limits for flexible oxygen hoses to ensure that they meet current certification and design standards and require that airplane operators replace hoses that do not meet these criteria or life limits
• and require operators of transport-category cargo airplanes to install smoke detectors in the supernumerary or similar airplane compartments

During its investigation, the Safety Board determined that reading lights located in passenger service units (PSU) could become a potential source of ignition to nearby combustible materials. Because of this, the Board recommended that the FAA require transport-category airplane operators to ensure that all reading lights in PSUs be installed with rubber boots or use other means to provide a greater level of electrical protection.

The Safety Board also voted to recommend that ABX Air modify its CASP so that all chronic discrepancies are effectively resolved. And the Board reiterated a previous recommendation to the FAA about training on an emergency response firefighting device.

Here is a link to the synopsis of the NTSB report on this accident: NTSB ID AAR-09-04.

The full report will be available in several weeks.

[Photo Source]

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Related:

• Bad week for freight carrier ABX Air - June 30, 2008
• Update: ABX Air B767 freighter fire at SFO - July 3, 2008
• NTSB to meet on ABX Air Boeing 767 freighter fire at San Francisco - June 24, 2009

Final report: 2007 Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 uncontained engine failure

On November 17, 2007, a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-300 aircraft (registration N676SW) suffered an uncontained engine failure in flight, during which pieces of the fan blades and the spinner separated from the number two (right) engine. No one was injured, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage to the engine and its housing components, as well as some damage to the fuselage and wing. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued a final report on the accident, concluding that the engine failure occurred "as a result of an unidentified object striking the spinner, separating it from the fan disk and causing the spinner to be ingested into the fan blades."

The Event

On November 17, 2007 the Boeing B737-300 aircraft, operating as Southwest Flight 438, departed Dallas Love Field en route to Little Rock with five crew members and 133 passengers on board. The number two engine, a CFM International CFM56-3B1, failed while the aircraft was climbing through FL250 to FL330. According to the NTSB report:

The flight crew reported feeling severe vibration, pulled both throttles back to idle, declared an emergency, and started an air turn back to Love Field (DAL), Dallas, TX.

While heading back to DAL, the pilot reported seeing the following cockpit warnings: a No. 2 constant speed drive (CSD) low oil pressure, No. 2 engine low oil pressure, No. 2 generator bus OFF, No. 2 pack trip OFF lights, and No. 2 engine vibration meter at 5 units.

The pilot also reported that while heading back to DAL, the start lever on the No. 2 engine was CLOSED. An uneventful single engine landing was performed and no injuries were reported to any of the occupants.

Airframe Damage

Once the aircraft was back on the ground it was discovered that there were "impact marks along the fuselage from about 10 feet aft of the right-hand forward entry door to about 6 feet forward of the right-hand aft entry door and along almost the entire length of right wing leading edge. The right horizontal stabilizer also exhibited impact marks along almost the entire leading edge." The aircraft's pressure vessel was not punctured.

Engine Damage

The NTSB reports that all of the fan blades in the number two exhibited heavy airfoil damage.

...all the fan blade roots remained installed in the disk, and several fan blades fractured near the platform.

The forward and rear spinner cones were no longer attached to the fan disk and a large penetration hole was noted on the right-hand side of the fan cowl just forward of the engine fan case.

No breaches of any of the engine cases or signs of fire damage were noted.

The pieces of the forward and rear spinners cones that exited the engine were never recovered, despite an extensive search on the ground. The missing engine components presumably fell to the ground in a sparsely populated rural area of Texas.

NTSB Findings

According to the NTSB report:

• Metallurgical examination of the fracture surfaces of the fan blades and the fragments of the rear spinner aft flange revealed no preexisting fatigue-type mechanism and all the fractures were consistent with overstress.
• Four sequential fan blade spacers were distorted consistent with a severe axial load rearward applied to the spacers by the rear spinner cone prior to the spinner cone release; however, no determination could be made as to the initial failure or what may have impacted the spinner cone.

Probable cause: "A total loss of engine power due to the No. 2 engine experiencing a release of its fan spinner through the fan cowl as a result of an unidentified object striking the spinner, separating it from the fan disk and causing the spinner to be ingested into the fan blades."

Here is the link to the NTSB final report: NTSB ID ENG08IA002 - June 22, 2009

NTSB to meet on ABX Air Boeing 767 freighter fire at San Francisco

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will meet next week to discuss the investigation of a fire aboard a cargo plane at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) last year. The meeting, which is open to the public, will take place on June 30, 2009 in Washington, DC.

The sole topic of discussion at the NTSB meeting will be the Board's final report on the fire that erupted on an ABX Air Boeing 767-200 aircraft (registration N799AX) on January 28, 2008, at about 10:15 pm local time. The aircraft, painted in DHL livery, was parked at SFO at the time of the accident.

The captain and first officer were on board, and were preparing to start the engines when the fire broke out. Both crew members evacuated the airplane through the cockpit windows and were not injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged.

According to the NTSB, a summary of the Board's final report, which will include findings, probable cause and safety recommendations, will appear on the website shortly after the conclusion of next week's meeting. The entire report will appear on the website several weeks later.

The NTSB meeting will convene on June 30, 2009 at 09:30 am in the NTSB Board Room and
Conference Center, 429 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C. A live and archived webcast of the proceedings will be available on the NTSB website at www.ntsb.gov.

[Photo Source]

ALPA Congressional Testimony on Regional Air Carriers and Pilot Workforce Issues

Capt. John Prater, president of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), appeared last week at a Congressional hearing regarding regional air carriers. Capt. Prater testified before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives. In his appearance on June 11, 2009, Capt. Prater addressed pilot workforce issues at regional carriers.

Here is an excerpt from Capt. Prater's oral testimony before Congress:

In recent years, the major airlines have come to rely heavily on codeshare arrangements with regional airlines to serve midsize and smaller cities in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. This has resulted in the exponential growth of the regional sector of the industry.

Still, the major carriers exert a great deal of economic pressures on the regional airlines to provide their service at the lowest possible price. They control ticket pricing and schedules, and regularly move flying between their regional partners. Some majors have even begun outsourcing their flying to regionals and laying off their own pilots with decades of experience in the process.

These experienced pilots cannot afford to work for a regional as a newly hired first officer. As a result, many of the smaller regional carriers hire pilots at the FAA minimum standards and do not employ screening processes during hiring that identify the “ideal” candidate.

As was brought out during the NTSB’s recent hearing on the tragic accident in Buffalo, many pilots who fly for regional airlines aren’t getting adequate training or enough rest. Airlines are requiring pilots to work longer days and more of them each month. Fleet and base changes are forcing pilots to decide between commuting and possibly taking a pay cut to train on new equipment. The consequence: the quality of airline pilot “careers” has been greatly diminished and severe erosion of benefits and quality of life are motivating pilots to move to other professions.

Current training practices do not take into account changing airline pilot demographics. Instead, they assume that pilots are far more experienced than they may actually be. ALPA believes there must be a new focus on standardization and even some fundamental flying skills. To meet this challenge, airlines and other training providers must develop methodologies to “train experience and judgment.” Current training practices may also need to be adjusted to account for the source and experience level of the pilot entering initial training at the airline.

ALPA also believes there should be more stringent academic requirements to obtain both commercial and airline transport pilot ratings in preparation for a career as an airline pilot. The FAA should develop and implement a structured and rigorous ground school and testing process for pilots who want to qualify to fly for Part 121 airlines.

ALPA also recommends that airlines provide specific command and leadership training courses for new captains to instill in them the necessary skills and traits to be a real leader on the flight deck. Airlines should also implement mentoring programs for both captains and first officers as they first enter operations in their crew positions to help them apply their knowledge and skills to line operations and supplement their own limited experience by learning from their peers.

Flight experience and pilot capabilities cannot be measured by mere flight hours. Screening processes should be established prior to initial pilot hiring to ensure that new‐hire airline pilots are indeed the best and the brightest as far as abilities, airmanship, professionalism, and performance.

Turning to another area of concern, fatigue has reached alarming levels within the industry. ALPA has long advocated changes to flight and duty time rules for commercial aviation operations, and we join the NTSB in calling for revisions that are based on readily available science.

We have talked long enough. It is time to implement these science‐based regulatory changes.

Other means to enhance safety and improve airline operations are data collection and analysis programs such as FOQA [Flight Operational Quality Assurance] and ASAP [Aviation Safety Action Plan] which provide important and needed safety information, not only internally within air carriers, but also for the overall air transportation system.

In order to allow these programs to grow and make the reports more readily obtainable, additional legislative protections need to be put in place that will limit the data use in civil liability cases. Restrictions also need to be strengthened to ensure the data is used for safety purposes only.

Many major carriers have implemented these programs and follow other best practices which should also be undertaken by their codeshare partners. ALPA joins with the NTSB in calling upon major airlines and their code‐sharing partners to establish a program of operational oversight that includes periodic safety audits of flight operations, training programs, and maintenance and inspection, as well as emphasize the exchange of information and resources to enhance the safety of flight operations.

The best safety device on any airplane is a well‐trained, well‐rested, highly motivated pilot. A strong safety culture must be instilled and consistently reinforced from the highest levels within an airline and among its codeshare partners. This type of organizational safety culture will encourage the highest levels of performance among professional pilots, improve airline operations, and, most importantly, advance aviation safety.

As is customary, Capt. Prater also submitted written testimony to the Congressional Committee. That document elaborates on the issues raised in the oral testimony, to provide more detail.

Excerpts from Capt. Prater's written testimony will be presented in successive posts here on ProPilotNews.com.

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Back to the bargaining table: Southwest Airlines pilots contract ratification vote fails

The membership of the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA) "officially declined to ratify a new five-year contract with Southwest Airlines." So said a press release issued by the union. According to SWAPA, the vote was very close: with over 95% of eligible pilots voting, just under 51% voted against the new contract. Nevertheless, a failure to ratify means it's back to the bargaining table.

Contract negotiations between Southwest Airlines and its pilots had begun as soon as the current contract became amendable back in September of 2006. A tentative contract agreement was reached in January of this year this year, and was endorsed by SWAPA's Board of Directors in March.

At that point, SWAPA President Capt. Carl Kuwitzky had said, "While this contract isn’t perfect, it does include improvements in many areas and shores up very old language that will protect our pilots'”

"Many in our pilot group are extremely sensitive to codesharing flights that Southwest Airlines could possibly fly. While some degree of codeshare is allowed in this contract, limitations on the Company help keep our jobs secure," Kuwitzky added.

Today SWAPA announced that they will reopen negotiations with Southwest Airlines after polling of the pilot group "to fully pinpoint the aspects that the pilots want to see readdressed in talks with the Company."

"Our pilots have spoken, and the group has stated there is more work to be done," Capt. Kuwitzky said after the vote results were announced. "This contract, despite some financial gains, contained too many other negative aspects to ratify it."

Speaking on behalf of Southwest Airlines management, Chuck Magill, Vice President of Flight Operations said, "We are naturally disappointed and acknowledge it was a very close vote."

"We reached a tentative agreement in good faith, and both sides put a lot of effort into getting to this point. We have an outstanding and highly productive group of Pilots, and we appreciate their active involvement in the voting process," said Magill. "We welcome the opportunity for our negotiating teams to re-engage and work toward an agreement that best meets the needs of our Company and our outstanding Pilots during these challenging economic times."

Regional jet in near-collision with Pilatus PC-12 after runway incursion at Charlotte

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is investigating a runway incursion that caused a near-collision several days ago at Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT), North Carolina. A PSA Airlines regional jet and a general aviation turboprop aircraft were involved in the incident, which occurred at about 10:17 AM on May 29, 2009. No one was injured.

At the time of the incident, a PSA Airlines CRJ-200 regional jet, operating as US Airways Express Flight 2390, was preparing to depart CLT for a scheduled passenger flight to Craven County Regional Airport, New Bern, NC (EWN). According to information released today by the NTSB, the jet was cleared for takeoff on runway 18L.

As the CRJ began its takeoff roll, a privately operated Pilatus PC-12 single engine turboprop aircraft was cleared to taxi into position and hold farther down the same runway in preparation for a departure roll that was to begin at the taxiway A intersection.

After the ground-based collision warning system (ASDE-X) alerted controllers to the runway incursion, the takeoff clearance for the regional jet was canceled. The jet rejected takeoff.

The pilot of the turboprop, seeing the regional jet coming down the runway on a collision course, taxied the PC-12 to the side of the runway. The FAA reported from the scene that the regional jet stopped approximately 10 feet from the PC-12.

On board the CRJ were three crew members and 42 passengers. The number on board the PC-12 was not mentioned, but the NTSB notes that there were no injuries reported among those on board either aircraft.

According to the NTSB, visual meteorological conditions prevailed with 9 miles visibility.

FAA wants to fine Gulfstream International Airlines for safety violations

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced today that it is proposing to fine Gulfstream International Airlines, Inc. for several violations of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). A $1.3 million civil penalty is proposed for the alleged violations by the Florida based carrier, including "improper scheduling of flight crew duty time, and the installation of unapproved air conditioner compressors and improperly maintained vent blowers on the airline's fleet of 27 BE-1900-D aircraft."

From an FAA press release about the alleged violations:

An FAA review of the airline's electronic record-keeping system for tracking crew duty and rest time revealed that Gulfstream International did not accurately input the proper data from its manually generated hard-copy aircraft logbook records into the electronic system. The discrepancies resulted in scheduling crew members in excess of daily and weekly flight time limitations.

During a June 2008 inspection, the FAA determined that the airline had installed unapproved automotive air conditioner compressors on its aircraft between September 2006 and May 2008. Following the FAA inspection, the airline grounded all of the affected aircraft and replaced the units with approved aircraft air conditioner compressors.

In the course of a July 2008 inspection of Gulfstream International avionics and component shops in Fort Lauderdale, the FAA discovered that the airline had installed improperly maintained vent blowers on six planes between January 2008 and June 2008. Following that inspection, the airline replaced the blowers with properly maintained units.

Gulfstream International Airlines has 30 days from the receipt of the civil penalty letter to respond to the FAA.

Alaska Airlines pilots approve new four-year contract

Alaska Airlines pilots have a new four-year contract. A large majority of the membership of the pilots' union, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), voted to approve the tentative contract agreement that was reached last month. Terms of the new contract are retroactive to Apr. 1, 2009.

ALPA reports that 95% of eligible pilots voted. Of those, 84% cast their ballots in favor of the new agreement.

According to ALPA, the new contract includes pay increases of nearly 12% for captains and 16–29.5% for first officers, effective April 1, 2009. It also includes a signing bonus, retirement options for current pilots, and work rules that provide increased flexibility for the pilots. Pilots hired post-ratification will participate in a 401(k) program with a 13.5% company contribution.

“This pilot group, along with pilots across our industry, have watched our pay, benefits, job security, and quality of life erode since 9/11,” said Capt. Bill Shivers, Alaska MEC chairman. “While this contract doesn’t restore everything, it does provide increases in pay and improvements in our work schedule and retirement flexibility while allowing our company to remain poised for success. We believe this is a positive step toward repairing the relationship between this pilot group and our management so that we can work together to achieve a company culture where everyone succeeds and prospers together.”

Alaska Airlines pilots had been working under an arbitrator-imposed contract since May 2005. That contract had cut their pay by as much as 35%.